GR 160261
10 November 2003
Facts: On 28 November 2001,
the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice
"to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E.
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August
2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23
October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed
by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional
as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether
or not the
petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding
that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was
presented before it.
Held: The court’s power of
judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a
hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating
the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. The
Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its
exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial review
over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What
lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this
Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with
the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government.
This
Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on
the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year
time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it not at all the business of this
Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government.
Political
questions are “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Citing
Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: “…The
powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within
its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of
justice… courts of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. The judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not
only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature…” a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political
law doctrine.
The
determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.
The
Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits
of the second impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of
this would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
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