Heirs of Marcelino Cabal vs. Sps. Lorenzo Cabal and Rosita Cabal

G.R. No. 153625
July 31, 2006

FACTS: 

During his lifetime, Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a parcel of land situated.  Sometime in 1954, Marcelo died, survived by his wife and his children.  It appears that sometime in 1949, five years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son, Marcelino, to build his house on a portion of the lot.  Since then, Marcelino resided thereon. Later, Marcelino’s son also built his house on the disputed property.

In 1964, Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the lot.  In the interim, based on a consolidated subdivision plan, it was revealed that Marcelino and his son occupied and built their houses on an area located on the southernmost portion of another lot and not the adjacent lot designated to him.  The spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal (respondents) confronted Marcelino on this matter which resulted to an agreement to a re-survey and swapping of lots for the purpose of reconstruction of land titles. However, the agreed resurvey and swapping of lots did not materialize.

Hence, respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages against Marcelino.  They alleged that Marcelino introduced improvements in bad faith on their land with knowledge that the adjacent lot is titled in his name.  Marcelino contends that respondents have no cause of action against him because he has been in possession in good faith since 1949 with the respondents’ knowledge and acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive prescription has set in.

ISSUES:

1)  Whether or not the lot where Marcelino built his house was co-owned by Marcelo’s children

2)  Whether or not Marcelino is a builder in good faith

HELD:

1) NO.  It is undisputed that Marcelino built his house on the disputed property in 1949 with the consent of his father. Marcelino has been in possession of the disputed lot since then with the knowledge of his co-heirs, such that even before his father died in 1954, when the co-ownership was created, his inheritance or share in the co-ownership was already particularly designated or physically segregated. Thus, even before the lot was subdivided, Marcelino already occupied the disputed portion and even then co-ownership did not apply over the disputed lot. Elementary is the rule that there is no co-ownership where the portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said portion is still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does make said portion less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners.

Thus, since Marcelino built a house and has been occupying the disputed portion since 1949, with the consent of his father and knowledge of the co-heirs, it would have been just and equitable to have segregated said portion in his favor and not one adjacent to it.

2) Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was informed by respondents of his encroachment on their property. Marcelino’s possession of the disputed lot was based on a mistaken belief that the lot covered by his title is the same lot on which he has built his house with the consent of his father. There is no evidence, other than bare allegation, that Marcelino was aware that he intruded on respondents’ property when he continued to occupy and possess the disputed lot after partition was effected.

Standard Oil Co. of New York vs Jaramillo

44 Phil 630

FACTS:
Gervasia dela Rosa executed a document in the form of a Chattel Mortgage purporting to convey to Standard Oil Co. by way of mortgage both the leasehold interest of the land she leases in Manila and the building which stands thereon.

The clauses in said document describe the property as personal including the right, title and interest of the mortgagor in and to the contract of lease and also the building of the said premises therein.

After said document had been duly acknowledge and delivered, the petitioner presented it to Joaquin Jaramillo, as register of deeds of the City of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded. The respondent opined that it was not a chattel mortgage for the interests mortgaged did not appear to be personal property within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law and registration was refused on this ground only.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not said property could be a subject for mortgage.

2. Whether the respondent is clothe with authority to determine such.

.

RULING:
The duties of a register of deeds in respect to the registration of chattel mortgages are of purely ministerial character and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage. The efficacy of the act of recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that it operates as constructive notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be discovered in the instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. Registration adds nothing to the instrument, considered as a source of title, and affects nobody’s rights except as a species of notice.

The parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property and it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property.

It is unnecessary to determine whether or not the property described in the document is real or personal. The issue is to be determined by the Court and not by the register of deeds.

NOTES: This is my own digest. Reading the whole text of the case is recommended.