Everything I wanted to share to law students, and all that I experienced, researched and learned about LAW.
Monday, October 1, 2012
FORMAT OF A CASE DIGEST
CASE DIGEST
Thursday, April 2, 2009
Elopement and Marriage
PROBLEM:
Mr. A desires to seek your services as counsel. His problem is that he has young daughter B, who is only 16 years old. B eloped with Mr. C, who is 26 years old. Mr. A the father desires to regain the custody of his minor daughter. As counsel for Mr. A, discuss all the steps you will take in accordance with your theory which you have formed.
ANSWER:
The question to be decided is whether Mr. A still retains his right to the custody of his minor daughter, B.
The first step is definitely to ascertain the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. The date when B eloped with C, the period of elopement and whether or not a marriage was constituted between B and C after the former eloped with the latter.
If the problem has been brought to my attention after elopement, immediately the second step is to file a petition before the court for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing any lawful officer to take from Mr. C and produce before the Court the person of B and requiring the former to justify his right to the custody of said minor, and, after hearing, to award said custody to his father, Mr. A. But if the elopement happened giving B and C the opportunity to contract a marriage, time has to be considered.
If the elopement and eventual marriage of a minor to a person of legal age took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law would be the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3631), particularly Section 2, which sets forth the required legal capacity of the contracting parties to marriage. On the other hand, if the minor eloped with a man of legal age and contracted marriage with him on or after August 3 of 1988, which is the date of the effectivity of the Family Code, then the pertinent provisions of said Code apply.
In the case of Ching Huat vs. Co Heong (GR. No. L-1211, January 30, 1947), Maria Ching, was then 15 years of age at the time she agreed to elope with and marry respondent Co Heong, 21 years of age or more, on June 21, 1946 in Plaridel Bulacan, before the Justice of the Peace of said municipality. Her father, Ching Huat, alleged that respondent, took advantage of his confidential and spiritual relation with Maria Ching as her godfather, and persuaded and induced her by means of trick, promises and cajolery, to leave the parental home and to elope with him in the night of June 21, 1946. However, the Court held that by virtue of Section 2 of Act No. 3631 or otherwise known as the Marriage Law of 1929, Maria Ching was already in her marriageable age. The marriage was valid as both complied with the essential requisites of marriage applicable during that time. Having been validly married on June 21, 1946, she became emancipated on that same date (as provided in arts. 314 [1] and 315, of the old Civil Code). This emancipation brought about the loss by her father of the parental authority that he was claiming. Hence, in this case, the Court denied the petition of Ching Huat for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Citing the foregoing case, it is clear that if the situation of B is as such, then Mr. A has no remedy by reason of the marriage as well as emancipation from parental authority. The second step should therefore to advise A of the consequences of actions to be taken.
If however, considering the minority of B who eloped with C at the time or after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus may pursue.
Mr. A could also file civil and criminal charges against Mr. C for the grievous moral wrong he committed and for seducing his minor daughter into contracting marriage with him.
As for the civil aspect, he may file on behalf of her daughter a petition for the declaration of the nullity of marriage under Art. 35 (1) of the Family Code.[1]
If Mr. C had carnal knowledge with B, A may likewise file a criminal suit against him for simple seduction under Art. 338 of the Revised Penal Code[2] or if only acts of lewdness were committed, Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC[3].
[1] Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians, xxx
[2] Art. 338. Simple seduction. — The seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor.
[3] Art. 339. Acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party. — The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed to punish any other acts of lasciviousness committed by the same persons and the same circumstances as those provided in Articles 337 and 338.
Monday, March 2, 2009
Presence of Treachery in Murder, not in Homicide
FACTS:
The accused A was charged of murder for stabbing B and the RTC sentenced B guilty of murder. One of the issues presented was whether or not the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the presence of treachery in killing B. As testified by eyewitnesses, A and B were drinking liquor in front of house of A. After drinking so much there was an argument between A and B and B went home to his house and returned to the place where they were drinking carrying with him a sharp bolo. When A came back, B was urinating on the dike of the fishpond near his house. A stabbed the victim B and hit him on his left chest as a result of the injury, B died.
ISSUES:
- Was there treachery?
- What is the crime committed by A? Murder or homicide?
ANSWER:
1. Citing People vs Cayabyab (GR. No. 123073, June 19, 1997), for treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (1) employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself, much less retaliate; and (2) conscious and deliberate adoption of the means of execution. More importantly, treachery must be based on some positive, conclusive proof and not only upon hypothetical facts or on mere supposition or presumption. It must be proved as cogently as the killing itself.
In the above mentioned facts, there was nothing stated that the accused attacked the victim from behind or whether the attack was unexpected, catching the victim totally unaware of the coming peril. There is indeed reasonable doubt on the presence of alevosia.
2. Article 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246[1] shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
[1] Art. 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Submitted to Judge Meneses, February 27, 2009.
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Facts similar to People vs Binondo
FACTS:
The accused, Juan, brought the head of a person to the police station with the following version:
At about 8 in the evening, the accused and his wife went to the store to drink tuba. On their way to the store, the victim, Pedro, suddenly emerged from under a mango tree and approached the accused in an angry mood carrying a gun on his left hand and a bolo on the right and at the same time brandishing his bolo as if in the act of charging him, saying, “Why are you looking for me? What is your purpose?”
The victim finally arrived and he tried to force open the main door but failed. So he shouted at the accused, "Juan, come out I will break your head.”
Juan position himself near the kitchen door, awaiting the attack of Pedro. Pedro forced open the kitchen door. When he was about to enter with his head protruding inside the kitchen, Juan aimed his rifle at the head of Pedro. From a distance of about one and one half (1-1/2) feet, he fired the rifle. When this happened, Pedro was still holding his firearm and his bolo and turned his head towards Juan and aimed his gun at him. But before Pedro could fire his gun, Juan attacked him with his bolo, his purpose to let the latter loosen his hold on his weapons. This was followed by five or six more strokes on the neck and body and so Pedro finally dropped his weapons and fell to the floor. Except on the skin of the nape, the head was almost severed from the body.
Knowing that Pedro have an amulet which could revive him if his body is doused with water, Juan finally decided to cut off the victim’s head completely. Immediately thereafter, he carried the victim's head to the police station and surrendered it to the police authorities.
PROBLEM/ISSUE:
During the trial, Juan invoked self-defense. If you were the judge, what will be your decision?
ANSWER:
Juan’s plea of self-defense is completely incredible and he is criminally liable for the commission of murder on the basis of admitting that he killed Pedro.
Citing People vs Binondo (G.R. No. 97227 October 20, 1992), well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that when the accused admits having killed the victim, but invokes self-defense, the burden of proving the elements of that defense by clear and convincing evidence lies with the accused. To do that, he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. (People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772 (1946): People vs. Libed, 14 SCRA 410 (1965); People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 634 (1972); People vs. Kindo, 95 SCRA 553 (1980); People vs. Bacoyot, 174 SCRA 285 (1989); People vs. Maceda, 197 SCRA 499 (1991).
Whether or not Juan acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact and the court will be the one to appreciate facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would have render its conclusion. The accused must present clear and convincing evidence for the court to sustain the claim of self-defense.
Even assuming that Juan’s story were true, the oral threat made by Pedro to kill him unaccompanied by any other unequivocal act clearly showing his intent to carry out his threat does not constitute unlawful aggression. Mere shouting threats and poundings on the door of the accused's house do not constitute unlawful aggression as held in People vs. Masangkay (157 SCRA 320, 1988).
Furthermore, the fact that Juan shut off all the lights inside the house, there could not have possibly been any form of attack which may be said to be immediate and imminent from the victim upon his person. Putting out the lights inside the house threw the house in total darkness that the victim could not be in a position to locate him physically.
Not only was there an absence of unlawful aggression in the case at bar, but the claim of self-defense is likewise negated by the physical evidence.
Juan suffered no harm or injury physically. The number and nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim proved that if at all, the attack came from the accused. The victim had no chance to defend himself even if armed. The means employed becomes unreasonable and unnecessary when after the aggression head ceased and the victim no longer posed any threat of further attack, the accused continued inflicting injuries on the victim who fell to the ground helpless.
What absolutely negated the existence of a "reasonable necessity of the means employed in repelling the attack” was the fact that the accused decapitated the victim. The claim that the victim possessed an amulet which could revive him did not justify that last and final act of cutting off the victim's head. A dead man could not have possibly posed any further resistance or launch an attack, be it imminent or remote.
Due to the absence of self-defense, the Court is to determine whether or not there was any attending circumstance which will qualify the killing to murder.
These facts clearly constitute treachery, which raised the crime to murder.
The presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery was evidence from the testimony of the accused himself. According to him, his wife arrived ahead of the victim and he was apprised of the fact that the victim was on his way to their house and was threatening to kill him. He had enough time to prepare himself, his weapons and surroundings in a way that he would have the advantage of position and could deliver the first blow without risk to himself from his unwary victim. This he accomplished by putting off all the lights inside the house and by positioning himself near the kitchen door where he could not be seen at once. The accused employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the offense which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Furthermore, when the killing was done with cruelty, by deliberately or inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, it was likewise qualified to murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any person with the exception of those persons who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, who shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
As regards the mitigating circumstances claimed, it may be off-set by the aggravating circumstances of treachery under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.”
. The accused could not, however, claim incomplete self-defense as there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
However, the killing was accompanied by the qualifying circumstance of outraging at the corpse of the victim, thus constituting the crime into murder. Treachery may be considered as a mere aggravating circumstance which may be set off by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
For reasons indicated, and in the light of the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter, from the given facts of the case, the accused is guilty of the crime of murder. And since every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Art 100, Revised Penal Code), it is just but right that the accused be ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim.
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Funeral Rights
FACTS and PROBLEM: Juana, 25 years old, single and living with Pedro. Pedro is a 25 year old married man. Juana died during pregnancy in the residence of Pedro. Carlos, Juana’s brother, wanted to get the dead body of his sister. He contends that he is the legal custodial of the deceased body. Pedro refused to allow Carlos to get the body of Juana. Is the contention of Carlos tenable?
ANSWER: The Civil Code of the
Art 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
“Those who are duty-bound to make arrangements shall be in accordance with the order established for support. This order is now governed by Article 199 of the Family Code which repealed Article 294 of the Civil Code and which provides that such duty shall devolve first on the spouse; in his or her absence or incapacity, the descendants in the nearest degree; in the absence or incapacity of the latter, the ascendants in the nearest degree; and finally, in the absence of all the said persons, the brothers and sisters.”1 (Emphasis supplied)
Pedro is not related in any way to Juana except that the latter is the former’s paramour. Though they might have lived as husband and wife, their cohabitation is not a valid ground for him to claim a right to the body of Juana. If he is to contend such, it is not meritorious. The law is clear and legally speaking, Carlos’ rights cannot be questioned when it comes to his claim to perform his duties as brother of Juana.
1 Sta. Maria, Jr., Melecio. Persons and Family Relations Law. 4th ed., 2004, p. 890.
NOTES: Submitted on my Legal Research Class, October 27, 2007
Monday, September 22, 2008
LAWFUL INFIDELITY
A was a widow when she was employed in court. B, a married man but living separately with his wife, fell in love with A. B and A lived together in one house as husband and wife. They had children. They made a pledge before their religious congregation in the presence of their elders. C, a conservative citizen not related either to A and B file a complaint asking that A should be dismissed because of immorality.
ISSUE/PROBLEM:
Can A be administratively liable based on immorality? Can her defense as Jehovah’s Witnesses be an exception or can she invoke her religion as justification?
RULING/ANSWER:
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE
“A common-law marriage may be defined as non-ceremonial or informal marriage by agreement, entered into by a man and a woman having capacity to marry, ordinarily without compliance with such statutory formalities. Such agreement must be coupled by consummation, which includes at least cohabitation as husband and wife, and reputation in such a way that the public will recognize their marriage status. Common law marriages are not recognized in the Philippines because the Civil Code and the Family Code expressly and mandatory provide that intervention in a valid marriage ceremony of an ecclesiastical or civil functionary authorized by the state to solemnize marriage constitute one of the indispensable requisites for a valid marriage. Hence, the word “spouses” refers only to husband and wife lawfully married according to Philippine laws and the phrase “husband and wife” refers to parties who are lawfully married, unless the law provides otherwise.”1
IMMORALITY
On this discussion, I advance to précis the first part of the dissenting opinion of Justice Ynares-Santiago on the Estrada vs. Escritor2 case.
“The degree of morality required of every employee or official in the public service is high and strict. The Civil Service Law punishes public officers and employees for disgraceful and immoral conduct. Whether an act is immoral within the meaning of the statute is not to be determined by respondent’s concept of morality. The law provides the standard; the offense is complete if respondent intended to perform, and did in fact perform, the act which it condemns. The layman’s definition of what is “moral” pertains to excellence of character or disposition. It relates to the distinction between right and wrong; virtue and vice; ethical praise or blame. Moral law refers to the body of requirements in conformity to virtuous action consists. That which is not consistent with or not conforming to moral law, opposed to or violating morality, and now, more often, morally evil or impure, is immoral. Immoral is the state of not being virtuous with regard to sexual conduct. Hence, anything contrary to the standards of moral conduct is immoral. A grossly immoral act must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.”3
The facts of the case stated is similar to that of the 2006 case decided by the Supreme Court – Estrada vs. Escritor.
Alejandro Estrada filed an administrative complaint against Soledad Escritor on July 27, 2000 claiming that she is commiting “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. –
(a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxx xxx xxx
..........(5) Disgraceful and immoral conduct;
................xxx.
The court in order to determine whether respondent’s invocation of his religious beliefs and/or right referred to Article III, Section 5 of the Philippine Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
In remanding the case, the court said that the government should intervene in the matter to examine the sincerity and certainty of Escritor’s disputation, look into whether there is evidence on the state’s compelling interest to override such contention and show the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to her religious freedom.
The Supreme Court upheld Escritor’s right to conjugal union as it chose to adhere to the “benevolent neutrality approach in the Constitution that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.6 They rule that under distinct circumstances, Ecritor’s cohabitation with Quilapio cannot be penalized as she made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right of freedom of religion. There is no violation of any law or rule as this would be an unconstitutional violation of their religious freedom.
In ruling that the “compelling state interest” test to be the applicable test in determining the State’s action in interfering with action pursuant to religious convictions has inquire into the “sincerity” of the beliefs of the party claiming such; determines what compelling state interest there is, if any, to interfere with the practice of religion; and the sanction to the means that intrude least into the free exercise of religion and that are proportionate to the attainment of a public and legal goal.
Simply put, Supreme Court ruled that couples living together without marrying are not immoral if their religion allows it.
In a voting decision of 9-5, Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban warned that the ruling could open the floodgates for people to use religion as an excuse to enter into illegal and immoral conjugal union. “The majority opinion will make every religion a separate republic, making religion a haven for criminal conduct that otherwise would be punishable under the law of the land. Today concubinage, tomorrow bigamy, will enjoy protection from criminal sanction under the new doctrine poised by the majority opinion,” said Associate Justice Antonio Carpio in a dissenting opinion. He cited US jurisprudence in warning that such a sweeping decision would “make professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land” and, in effect, “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”
“This case is about a religious cover for an obviously criminal act,” the dissenters said.
In her separate opinion, Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago sought for the suspension of Escritor for six months for her disgraceful conduct in court. “The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court judges and court employees are required to maintain the people’s faith in the court as a dispenser of justice, and whose image is mirrored by their actuations,” she said. “The high degree of moral uprightness is demanded of employees of the government and entails many sacrifices that are peculiar to the civil service,” she added.
The far reaching significance of this case decision is that if Escritor is not a Jehovah’s Witness, her actuations and behavior would indeed constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct, as well as adultery and concubinage, under prevailing law and jurisprudence.
_______________________________________
1 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations Law, 4th ed., Philippines: Manila, 2004, pp. 122-123.
2 A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006. 492 SCRA 1.
3 Id., pp. 92-94.
4 DECLARATION OF PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS
..........I recognize this relationship as a binding tie before ‘Jehovah’ God and before all persons to be held to and honored in full accord with the principles of God’s Word. I will continue to seek the means to obtain legal recognition of this relationship by the civil authorities and if at any future time a change in circumstances make this possible, I promise to legalize this union.
..........Signed this 28th day of July 1991.
5 Estrada vs. Escritor. A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003
6 Art.III, Sec. 5. of the 1987 Philippine Constitution: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
- Sta. Maria, Jr., Melencio S. Persons and Family Relations Law. 4th ed. Philippines: Manila. 2004.
- Estrada vs. Escritor. A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006. 492 SCRA 1.
- Requejo, Rey E. Supreme Court says living-in not immoral. Manila Standard Today. June 23, 2006.
Sunday, August 31, 2008
A CRIMINAL ACT TO END A LIFE BEFORE BIRTH
Under our present Constitution, the State equally protects the “life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”1 This does not say that the unborn is a legal person; nor does it deny, however, that the state under certain conditions might regard the unborn as a person. It does not assert that the life the unborn is place on exactly the same level as the life of the mother. It recognizes that, when necessary to save the life of the mother, it may be necessary and legitimate to sacrifice the life of the unborn. It, however, denies that the life of the unborn may be sacrificed merely to save the mother from emotional suffering or to spare the child from a life of poverty. The emotional trauma of a mother as well as the welfare of the child after birth can be attended to through other means such as availing of the resources of welfare agencies.2
In the Roe vs. Wade3 decision, abortion law was liberalized by allowing such up to the sixth month of pregnancy at the discretion of the mother any time during the first six months when it can be done without danger to the mother. The Supreme Court decision in the said case overturned a Texas interpretation of abortion law. It held that a woman, with her doctor, could choose abortion in earlier months of pregnancy without restriction, and with restrictions in later months, based on the right to privacy. It invalidated all state laws limiting women's access to abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy. State laws limiting such access during the second trimester were upheld only when the restrictions were for the purpose of protecting the health of the pregnant woman. Roe vs. Wade legalized abortion in the United States, which was not legal at all in many states and was limited by law in others. The decision was rendered in protection of a person’s right to privacy having it based primarily on the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a part of the Bill of Rights stating that “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”.4
The unborn’s entitlement to protection begin from the moment of conception. In biology, it means the fertilization of an egg cell by a sperm cell and thus marks the beginning of pregnancy. By its meaning as a noun in the Encarta dictionary, it means the beginning or origin of something. The moment of conception, however, is hard to pin-point hence abortion is made illegal in the Philippines by leaning to the safer side of the argument.
Pursuant to this policy and principle, the Revised Penal Code penalizes and makes it a crime to a willfully kill the “fetus in the uterus or the violent expulsion of the fetus from the maternal womb which results in the death of the fetus.”5 Articles 256 to 259 of the same code define the various ways and means by which abortion is committed and this ordinarily means as the “expulsion of the fetus before the sixth month or before the term of its viability, that is, capable of sustaining life.”6 Therefore, once a woman is known to be pregnant, a life of a new being, distinct and separate from her body is existent and that made her decision to herself becomes questionable.
In the Philippines, there being harmony between the State principle and the criminal law on abortion, the decision in Roe vs. Wade will never be realized.
1 The 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article II, Section 12.
2 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (2003), pp. 84-85.
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 Jone Johnson Lewis, Roe v. Wade Supreme Court Decision, Retrieved March 19, 2008 at http://womenshistory.about.com/od/abortionuslegal/p/roe_v_wade.htm.
5 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law, Book II (2001), p. 488.
6 Ibid.
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