Elopement and Marriage

PROBLEM:

            Mr. A desires to seek your services as counsel. His problem is that he has young daughter B, who is only 16 years old. B eloped with Mr. C, who is 26 years old. Mr. A the father desires to regain the custody of his minor daughter. As counsel for Mr. A, discuss all the steps you will take in accordance with your theory which you have formed.

 

ANSWER:

            The question to be decided is whether Mr. A still retains his right to the custody of his minor daughter, B.

            The first step is definitely to ascertain the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. The date when B eloped with C, the period of elopement and whether or not a marriage was constituted between B and C after the former eloped with the latter.

            If the problem has been brought to my attention after elopement, immediately the second step is to file a petition before the court for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing any lawful officer to take from Mr. C and produce before the Court the person of B and requiring the former to justify his right to the custody of said minor, and, after hearing, to award said custody to his father, Mr. A. But if the elopement happened giving B and C the opportunity to contract a marriage, time has to be considered.

            If the elopement and eventual marriage of a minor to a person of legal age took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law would be the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3631), particularly Section 2, which sets forth the required legal capacity of the contracting parties to marriage. On the other hand, if the minor eloped with a man of legal age and contracted marriage with him on or after August 3 of 1988, which is the date of the effectivity of the Family Code, then the pertinent provisions of said Code apply.

            In the case of Ching Huat vs. Co Heong (GR. No. L-1211, January 30, 1947), Maria Ching, was then 15 years of age at the time she agreed to elope with and marry respondent Co Heong, 21 years of age or more, on June 21, 1946 in Plaridel Bulacan, before the Justice of the Peace of said municipality. Her father, Ching Huat, alleged that respondent, took advantage of his confidential and spiritual relation with Maria Ching as her godfather, and persuaded and induced her by means of trick, promises and cajolery, to leave the parental home and to elope with him in the night of June 21, 1946. However, the Court held that by virtue of Section 2 of Act No. 3631 or otherwise known as the Marriage Law of 1929, Maria Ching was already in her marriageable age. The marriage was valid as both complied with the essential requisites of marriage applicable during that time. Having been validly married on June 21, 1946, she became emancipated on that same date (as provided in arts. 314 [1] and 315, of the old Civil Code). This emancipation brought about the loss by her father of the parental authority that he was claiming. Hence, in this case, the Court denied the petition of Ching Huat for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

            Citing the foregoing case, it is clear that if the situation of B is as such, then Mr. A has no remedy by reason of the marriage as well as emancipation from parental authority. The second step should therefore to advise A of the consequences of actions to be taken.

            If however, considering the minority of B who eloped with C at the time or after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus may pursue.

            Mr. A could also file civil and criminal charges against Mr. C for the grievous moral wrong he committed and for seducing his minor daughter into contracting marriage with him.

            As for the civil aspect, he may file on behalf of her daughter a petition for the declaration of the nullity of marriage under Art. 35 (1) of the Family Code.[1]

            If Mr. C had carnal knowledge with B, A may likewise file a criminal suit against him for simple seduction under Art. 338 of the Revised Penal Code[2] or if only acts of lewdness were committed, Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC[3].

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[1] Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians, xxx

[2] Art. 338. Simple seduction. — The seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor.

[3] Art. 339. Acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party. — The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed to punish any other acts of lasciviousness committed by the same persons and the same circumstances as those provided in Articles 337 and 338.

LAWFUL INFIDELITY

CASE/FACTS:

A was a widow when she was employed in court. B, a married man but living separately with his wife, fell in love with A. B and A lived together in one house as husband and wife. They had children. They made a pledge before their religious congregation in the presence of their elders. C, a conservative citizen not related either to A and B file a complaint asking that A should be dismissed because of immorality.

ISSUE/PROBLEM:

Can A be administratively liable based on immorality? Can her defense as Jehovah’s Witnesses be an exception or can she invoke her religion as justification?

RULING/ANSWER:

COMMON LAW MARRIAGE

“A common-law marriage may be defined as non-ceremonial or informal marriage by agreement, entered into by a man and a woman having capacity to marry, ordinarily without compliance with such statutory formalities. Such agreement must be coupled by consummation, which includes at least cohabitation as husband and wife, and reputation in such a way that the public will recognize their marriage status. Common law marriages are not recognized in the Philippines because the Civil Code and the Family Code expressly and mandatory provide that intervention in a valid marriage ceremony of an ecclesiastical or civil functionary authorized by the state to solemnize marriage constitute one of the indispensable requisites for a valid marriage. Hence, the word “spouses” refers only to husband and wife lawfully married according to Philippine laws and the phrase “husband and wife” refers to parties who are lawfully married, unless the law provides otherwise.”1

IMMORALITY

On this discussion, I advance to précis the first part of the dissenting opinion of Justice Ynares-Santiago on the Estrada vs. Escritor2 case.

“The degree of morality required of every employee or official in the public service is high and strict. The Civil Service Law punishes public officers and employees for disgraceful and immoral conduct. Whether an act is immoral within the meaning of the statute is not to be determined by respondent’s concept of morality. The law provides the standard; the offense is complete if respondent intended to perform, and did in fact perform, the act which it condemns. The layman’s definition of what is “moral” pertains to excellence of character or disposition. It relates to the distinction between right and wrong; virtue and vice; ethical praise or blame. Moral law refers to the body of requirements in conformity to virtuous action consists. That which is not consistent with or not conforming to moral law, opposed to or violating morality, and now, more often, morally evil or impure, is immoral. Immoral is the state of not being virtuous with regard to sexual conduct. Hence, anything contrary to the standards of moral conduct is immoral. A grossly immoral act must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.”3

ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY

The facts of the case stated is similar to that of the 2006 case decided by the Supreme Court – Estrada vs. Escritor.

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Alejandro Estrada filed an administrative complaint against Soledad Escritor on July 27, 2000 claiming that she is commiting “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:

Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. –
(a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxx xxx xxx
..........(5) Disgraceful and immoral conduct;
................xxx.

Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter and member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses was accused of cohabiting with Luciano Quilapio, while they were still married to other persons. Their relationship of 23 years had borne a son. Respondent testified that when she was employed by the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow and that her cohabitation with Quilapio had the approval of their sect as proven by a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.4 By virtue of this, their union was legitimized. Hence, their cohabitation is not immoral and they remain good members in their congregation.

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The court in order to determine whether respondent’s invocation of his religious beliefs and/or right referred to Article III, Section 5 of the Philippine Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The Supreme Court on their decision on the same case dated August 4, 20035, favored Escritor and remanded the case to the Office of the Court Administrator and ordered the Solicitor General to examine her claimed religious belief and practice and to prevent evidence in justifying an exception to prevailing law and jurisprudence governing illicit relations.

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In remanding the case, the court said that the government should intervene in the matter to examine the sincerity and certainty of Escritor’s disputation, look into whether there is evidence on the state’s compelling interest to override such contention and show the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to her religious freedom.

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The Supreme Court upheld Escritor’s right to conjugal union as it chose to adhere to the “benevolent neutrality approach in the Constitution that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.6 They rule that under distinct circumstances, Ecritor’s cohabitation with Quilapio cannot be penalized as she made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right of freedom of religion. There is no violation of any law or rule as this would be an unconstitutional violation of their religious freedom.

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In ruling that the “compelling state interest” test to be the applicable test in determining the State’s action in interfering with action pursuant to religious convictions has inquire into the “sincerity” of the beliefs of the party claiming such; determines what compelling state interest there is, if any, to interfere with the practice of religion; and the sanction to the means that intrude least into the free exercise of religion and that are proportionate to the attainment of a public and legal goal.

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Simply put, Supreme Court ruled that couples living together without marrying are not immoral if their religion allows it.

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In a voting decision of 9-5, Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban warned that the ruling could open the floodgates for people to use religion as an excuse to enter into illegal and immoral conjugal union. “The majority opinion will make every religion a separate republic, making religion a haven for criminal conduct that otherwise would be punishable under the law of the land. Today concubinage, tomorrow bigamy, will enjoy protection from criminal sanction under the new doctrine poised by the majority opinion,” said Associate Justice Antonio Carpio in a dissenting opinion. He cited US jurisprudence in warning that such a sweeping decision would “make professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land” and, in effect, “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”

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“This case is about a religious cover for an obviously criminal act,” the dissenters said.

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In her separate opinion, Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago sought for the suspension of Escritor for six months for her disgraceful conduct in court. “The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court judges and court employees are required to maintain the people’s faith in the court as a dispenser of justice, and whose image is mirrored by their actuations,” she said. “The high degree of moral uprightness is demanded of employees of the government and entails many sacrifices that are peculiar to the civil service,” she added.

The far reaching significance of this case decision is that if Escritor is not a Jehovah’s Witness, her actuations and behavior would indeed constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct, as well as adultery and concubinage, under prevailing law and jurisprudence.

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1 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations Law, 4th ed., Philippines: Manila, 2004, pp. 122-123.
2 A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006. 492 SCRA 1.
3 Id., pp. 92-94.
4 DECLARATION OF PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS

..........I, Soledad S. Escritor, do hereby declare that I have accepted Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr., as my mate in marital relationship; that I have done all within my ability to obtain legal recognition of this relationship by the proper public authorities and that it is because of having been unable to do so that I therefore make this public declaration pledging faithfulness in this marital relationship.
..........I recognize this relationship as a binding tie before ‘Jehovah’ God and before all persons to be held to and honored in full accord with the principles of God’s Word. I will continue to seek the means to obtain legal recognition of this relationship by the civil authorities and if at any future time a change in circumstances make this possible, I promise to legalize this union.
..........Signed this 28th day of July 1991.
5 Estrada vs. Escritor. A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003
6 Art.III, Sec. 5. of the 1987 Philippine Constitution: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

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REFERENCES:

• Sta. Maria, Jr., Melencio S. Persons and Family Relations Law. 4th ed. Philippines: Manila. 2004.
• Estrada vs. Escritor. A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006. 492 SCRA 1.
• Requejo, Rey E. Supreme Court says living-in not immoral. Manila Standard Today. June 23, 2006.

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Note: Submitted to Retired Judge Illuminado Meneses. This is my Legal Research Paper No. 5.