UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163858

June 28, 2005

FACTS:

UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine. 

HELD:

It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

TOPIC: Checks and Balances

GR 160261, 10 November 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

The judicial power that is granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. Our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

TOPIC: Political Question

GR 160261

10 November 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it.

Held: The court’s power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned.  The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land.  What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. 

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.  Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.  Because it not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

Political questions are “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.”  It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: “…The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary.  Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.  Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice… courts of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers.  The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.  This is not only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature…” a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law doctrine.

The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.  If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. 

The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint.  More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.  Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.

Reapportionment in Pangasinan: House Bill 4267

It is disappointing that because of political interest of local officials, which is tantamount to their personal interest, large scale development is hindered.

Last Monday, September 1, 2008, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan rejected House Bill 4267: “An Act Reapportioning the Province of Pangasinan into Seven Legislative Districts” authored by 2nd District Representative Victor Aguedo E. Agbayani and co-sponsored by 3rd District Representative Rachel Arenas and 1st District Representative Arthur Celeste, who, however, withdrew later his sponsorship. The provincial board, in Provincial Resolution No. 770-2008 or known as a “Resolution strongly opposing House Bill 4267”, shot down the plan citing that the reapportionment is unconstitutional because of its gerrymandering character, it lack local consultations and is seen as politically-motivated move.


GERRYMANDERING

Second District Board Member Von Mark Mendoza branded the proposal of the bill as a politically-motivated move because of suspicious realignment of towns that seems to defy geographical locations.

At present, the localities under the first district are Bolinao, Anda, Agno, Bani, Alaminos City, Sual, Mabini, Burgos, Dasol and Infanta; second district comprises Labrador, Lingayen, Binmaley, Bugallon, Aguilar, Mangatarem, Urbiztondo and Basista; and San Carlos City, Bayambang, Malasiqui, Sta. Barbara, Mapandan and Calasiao are in the third district.


Under the redistricting bill, the first district will be composed of Bolinao, Anda, Agno, Bani, Alaminos City and Burgos; and under second district are Sual, Mabini, Dasol, Infanta, Labrador, Lingayen and Binmaley. Geographically, the towns of Mabini, Dasol and Infanta which are located south-west of Pangasinan will be displaced as the three are about two hours away from Lingayen. The third district will be composed of San Carlos City, Bugallon, Aguilar, Mangatarem, Urbiztondo and Basista; while the fourth district will be composed of Bayambang, Malasiqui, Sta. Barbara, Mapandan and Calasiao. The current fourth, fifth and sixth districts will become fifth, sixth and seventh districts.


Sec 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

The underlying principle behind this rule is the concept of equality of representation which is the basic principle of Republicanism (Matias vs COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1, 7-8; 1961). One man’s vote should carry as much weight as the vote of every other man. In a representative system, this equality is ensured by requiring that the representatives represent as much as possible an equal number of constituents. This can be achieved either by making representatives represent districts of equal sizes in terms of inhabitants or by requiring that larger representative districts should be entitled to more representatives.

Moreover, in the same Article, Sec 5(3) provides:

Section 5. (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

This section is a prohibition of gerrymandering, which means the creation of representative districts out of separate portions of territory in order to favor a candidate.


LACK OF LGU CONSULTATION
House Bill 4267 was approved by the lower house on August 5, 2008, transmitted to and received by the Senate on August 11, 2008.

The Provincial Board expressed dismay over the non-information and non-consultation done with local officials affected by the House Bill 4267. It was only when the bill already passed plenary debate in the House of Representatives and is now in the Senate for concurrence that the matter come to their knowledge.

On the contrary, Agbayani said that consultation was made about the matter on the barangay level deploying leaders to achieve feedbacks. He also added that the board members should not worry because there will be more consultations top be made. He acknowledged the Provincial Board’s side on the issue.

Notwithstanding this contention, it has been held in Bai Sandra Sema vs COMELEC and Didagen Dilangalen, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008 that certainly, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5(4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.

The exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office.

In a radio interview in Bombo Radyo Dagupan, Representative Agbayani said that reapportionment would mean more development for the province in terms of additional countryside development fund and other benefits due to a legislative district. At present, each congressman is allotted P70 million countryside development fund annually to be used for development programs and projects in his/her district. A new district, he also added, would mean 70 million pesos development fund for the province.


POLITICAL INTEREST/

POLITICALLY MOTIVATED MOVE
The provincial board eyed the move as a tactical maneuver to suit political ends. Agbayani defended the move saying reapportionment of congressional districts is mandated by the Constitution. The first three districts are now qualified to be reapportioned to four districts as each district would have the minimum required population of 250,000.00

Pangasinan, whose population stands at 2,645,395, may now qualify to have up to 10 districts. Agbayani said it was high time to reapportion districts in the province. “I cannot recall how many Census had already been undertaken after 1987,” said Agbayani. He stressed that it is only now that an additional congressional district is being sought.

Agbayani and Arenas believed that Pangasinan would have a better representation in the House of Reps and that development would be a lot faster if an additional legislative district is created.

Sixth District Board Member Alfonso Bince believes that the division of Pangasinan is the best alternative to HB 4267. Dividing the province into 2 parts—Western and Eastern and not redistricting nor creating a new district is best for Pangasinan’s development. “If this HB is approved, it will dilute the configuration in the present SP, it will reduce financial assistance of the Provincial Government to the districts and worst about it is that redistricting is not subject to plebiscite unlike division of provinces or towns,” Bince further reiterated.

Pangasinan at present is only one of the three provinces that allow two district Board Members in every congressional district. Likewise, there is a law that mandates a maximum of 12 district BMs. Thus, the reapportionment of the existing districts into seven new one’s will only create political and legal problems because the consequence would, there will be 14 regular board members and that will be more than what is under the law.
.

Bince further stated that redistricting should be province-wide and not for selected districts only.

REPRESENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Seeing the issue as it transpires, it is the incumbent officials sitting in their most glorified seats, are the most upset because they have been painstakingly built their bailiwicks in the present compositions of districts; sowed money, time and effort in their ward leaders and now only to be suddenly derailed and discomfited by Congressmen supporting House Bills as such.

Only a homegrown debate engaged in by proponents and the opposition will help explain the bill to the people, especially those who will be affected by the changes if it is eventually approved and passed into law. After all, any decision involving the districts should not be so much a political issue but a matter of what would be best for the development of the province and its people.

Nevertheless, HB 4267 has given the people of Pangasinan their legal right in Congressional representation. The people control the government and the latter must do everything it can to help the people advance their cause. Our district representatives should be held responsible for being aware of what the Philippine Constitution provides for their fellow constituents, and that knowing the importance of the Census Population and the legal right the Constitution gave to every municipality and cities of every district—adding another Congressional district and a respective Representative in the Philippine Congress is paramount. As a matter of fact, If Pangasinan is entitled to 10 legislative districts, how come our Congressmen did not make the legal change of adding districts within the limited time allowed by the Constitution? Was this a constitutional oversight or a political control issue?

The more Congressional seats Pangasinan gets, legally, the more political power it can muster against the established quo of neglect for its constituency. It will help shift the political hegemony in Manila-centric politics, and rightfully transform the voice of Pangasinenses into a very powerful tool its leaders can use to bring home deserved funds to improve the province’s infrastructure from the towns and cities to the neglected barrios. The shameful begging days will be over, and due respect and treatment will be earned for the political might of Pangasinenses. Let us not forget though that by current statistics, Pangasinan is placed as the third (3rd) largest province in The Philippines! It has earned the right to have a powerful voice and influence in the country's political arena.

Although the aforementioned powerful political scenario holds many possibilities for Pangasinenses, we must also reflect on the possibility that it can be used negatively in the historical corruption of national and local politics. We only hope the good spirit of humanity prevails.



REFERENCES:

• Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary. Philippines: Quezon City. 2003 ed.
• Creation of ARMM's Shariff Kabunsuan is Invalid. Published August 31st, 2008 .
• National Statistics Office Website. Pangasinan Population.