Gonzales vs Echanova (9 SCRA 230)

FACTS:

Respondent executive secretary authorized importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter and president of Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Assoc. filed and averring that in making or attempting to make importation of foreign rice are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because RA 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency.

ISSUE:
Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

HELD:

The power of judicial review is vested with the supreme court in consonance to section 2 art. VIII of the constitution. The alleged consummation of the contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic. RA 2207 enjoins our government not from entering contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under conditions prescribed in said act.

US vs Ruiz (136 SCRA 487)

FACTS:
The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

ISSUE:
Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

HELD:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

Heirs of Marcelino Cabal vs. Sps. Lorenzo Cabal and Rosita Cabal

G.R. No. 153625
July 31, 2006

FACTS: 

During his lifetime, Marcelo Cabal was the owner of a parcel of land situated.  Sometime in 1954, Marcelo died, survived by his wife and his children.  It appears that sometime in 1949, five years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son, Marcelino, to build his house on a portion of the lot.  Since then, Marcelino resided thereon. Later, Marcelino’s son also built his house on the disputed property.

In 1964, Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves the lot.  In the interim, based on a consolidated subdivision plan, it was revealed that Marcelino and his son occupied and built their houses on an area located on the southernmost portion of another lot and not the adjacent lot designated to him.  The spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal (respondents) confronted Marcelino on this matter which resulted to an agreement to a re-survey and swapping of lots for the purpose of reconstruction of land titles. However, the agreed resurvey and swapping of lots did not materialize.

Hence, respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages against Marcelino.  They alleged that Marcelino introduced improvements in bad faith on their land with knowledge that the adjacent lot is titled in his name.  Marcelino contends that respondents have no cause of action against him because he has been in possession in good faith since 1949 with the respondents’ knowledge and acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive prescription has set in.

ISSUES:

1)  Whether or not the lot where Marcelino built his house was co-owned by Marcelo’s children

2)  Whether or not Marcelino is a builder in good faith

HELD:

1) NO.  It is undisputed that Marcelino built his house on the disputed property in 1949 with the consent of his father. Marcelino has been in possession of the disputed lot since then with the knowledge of his co-heirs, such that even before his father died in 1954, when the co-ownership was created, his inheritance or share in the co-ownership was already particularly designated or physically segregated. Thus, even before the lot was subdivided, Marcelino already occupied the disputed portion and even then co-ownership did not apply over the disputed lot. Elementary is the rule that there is no co-ownership where the portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said portion is still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does make said portion less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners.

Thus, since Marcelino built a house and has been occupying the disputed portion since 1949, with the consent of his father and knowledge of the co-heirs, it would have been just and equitable to have segregated said portion in his favor and not one adjacent to it.

2) Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith at least until the time he was informed by respondents of his encroachment on their property. Marcelino’s possession of the disputed lot was based on a mistaken belief that the lot covered by his title is the same lot on which he has built his house with the consent of his father. There is no evidence, other than bare allegation, that Marcelino was aware that he intruded on respondents’ property when he continued to occupy and possess the disputed lot after partition was effected.