Legal Medicine, General Consideration

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

TOPIC: Checks and Balances

GR 160261, 10 November 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

The judicial power that is granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. Our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

TOPIC: Political Question

GR 160261

10 November 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it.

Held: The court’s power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned.  The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land.  What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. 

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.  Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.  Because it not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

Political questions are “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.”  It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: “…The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary.  Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.  Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice… courts of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers.  The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.  This is not only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature…” a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law doctrine.

The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.  If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. 

The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint.  More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.  Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.

Jose Rizal College vs. NLRC

FACTS:

The National Alliance of Teachers sued Jose Rizal College for alleged nonpayment of unworked holidays from 1975 to 1977. The members of the Alliance concerned are faculty members who are paid on the basis of student contract hour.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the school faculty are entitled to unworked holiday pay.

HELD:

As far as unworked regular holidays are concerned, the teachers are not entitled to holiday pay. Regular holidays specified as such by law are known to both school and faculty members as no class days;” certainly the latter do not expect payment for said unworked days, and this was clearly in their minds when they entered into the teaching contracts.

On the other hand, the teachers are entitled to be paid for unworked special holidays. Otherwise stated, the faculty member, although forced to take a rest, does not earn what he should earn on that day. Be it noted that when a special public holiday is declared, the faculty member paid by the hour is deprived of expected income, and it does not matter that the school calendar is extended in view of the days or hours lost, for their income that could be earned from other sources is lost during the extended days. Similarly, when classes are called off or shortened on account of typhoons, floods, rallies, and the like, these faculty members must likewise be paid, whether or not extensions are ordered.

Jahara, et.al. vs. The Mindanao Lumber Company

G.R. No. L-36830

February 16, 1933

FACTS:

This is an action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by the plaintiffs for the recovery of compensation from the defendant company for the death of the workman, Moro Sapturani, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3482, otherwise as the "Workmen's Compensation Act."

The late Moro Kingan was engaged in the business of cutting timber within the defendant's concession, employing laborers for that purpose, among them Sapturani. Kingan paid his cutter's wages and delivered the timber and firewood to the defendant company which paid him the corresponding value thereof. On the morning of February 12, 1930, between 6 and 6.30 o'clock, Sapturani, who was about to go to the place where he was engaged in cutting timber, by means of the defendant's train operating in the place, was run over by the last car of the train as it was moving backwards, and died almost instantly as a result of injuries received on different parts of his body.

Mora Jahara, the divorced wife of the deceased, his daughters, Albaya and Mandasiang, and their respective husbands, Ladaya and Bachaja, are the plaintiffs and appellants in this case.

ISSUE:

1.     The court a quo erred in holding that the accident causing the death of Moro Sapturani was due to his negligence in trying to embark on the rear platform of the train of the defendant corporation at the Chinkang Sawmill, Naga-Naga, which was moving backwards at the time of the accident, and not holding that Moro Sapturani was overrun and killed by the train of the defendant corporation thru the negligence and carelessness of the employees of the latter.

2.     The trial court erred in holding that the preponderance of the weight of evidence is in favor of the defendant and against that of the plaintiffs.

3.     The trial court erred in holding that in view of the negligence of Moro Sapturani, the defendant cannot be made liable for the payment of compensation to the plaintiffs under the Worksmen's Compensation Act No. 3428 as amended by Act No. 3812, and in not holding that even admitting the facts stated in the decision, the paupers- appellants are still entitled to their claim under the law.

HELD:
The trial court declared that the deceased was notoriously negligent in connection with the accident, because the evidence shows that he tried to board the rear platform of the car as it was moving backwards; that he succeeded in getting a foothold but failing to obtain a hold of the car, he fell to the ground and was run over by the train.

The Court reviewed all the evidence presented and find that the conclusions reached by the trial court are supported by preponderance thereof. It noted that the plaintiffs' witnesses gave a different version of the accident. It also agree with the lower court that Sapturani acted with notorious negligence in attempting to board the train in the manner in which he did and, consequently, the action cannot be maintained in accordance with subdivision 3 of section 4 of Act No. 3428 which provides that no action for the recovery of compensation shall prosper when the accident upon which it is based is due to the notorious negligence of the workman.

Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino

151 SCRA 333

FACTS;

On December 22, 1971, Rolando Lim, a licensed second mate, died when the vessel he was on board ran a ground and sank near Sabtan, Batanes. The vessel was owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime Corporation. The parents of the deceased claiming that the untimely death of their son was due to the negligence of the petitioner sued the petitioner in the CFI for damages. By way of affirmative defense, petitioner claimed that the private respondents had already been compensated by the Workman’s Compensation Commission (WCC) for the same incident, for which reason they are now precluded from seeking other remedies against the same employer under the Civil Code.

ISSUE:  

Whether the compensation remedy under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA), and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by an employee ,is exclusive of the other remedies under the Civil Code.

HELD:

In the recent case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, the Court was confronted with three divergent opinions on the exclusivity rule.   One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to recover damages (not compensation under the Workman’s Compensation Act) with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil Code. Another view is that the remedy of an employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of WCA. The third view is that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. The Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA. As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their present action to recover additional damages against petitioner under the Civil Code. In open court, respondent admitted that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and had received the compensation payable to them under the WCA. It is therefore clear that the respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof; he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, he is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission.

Alano vs. Employee' Compensation Commission

158 SCRA 669

FACTS:

Dedicacion De Vera worked as principal of Salinap Community School in san Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her usual tour of duty was from 7:30 am to 5:30 pm. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00AM while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to school, she was bumped and ran over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted to her instantaneous death. Her brother GenerosoAlano filed the instant claim for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent’s children. The claim was denied by GSIS on the ground that the injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law. The ECC affirmed the denial by GSIS. It claimed that the deceased’s accident did not meet the conditions under the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. First, the accident occurred at about 7:00 am or thirty minutes before the deceased’s working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

HELD:

YES. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal’s being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

Iloilo Doc & Engineering Co. V. Workmen’s Compensation Commission

27 SCRA 103

FACTS:

Teodoro Pablo and Rodolfo Galopez, had just finished overtime work at 5:00 pm and was going home. At around 5:02 pm, while Pablo and Galopez were walking along the IDECO road, about20 meters from the IDECO main gate, Pablo was shot by Martin Cordero. The motive for the crime was and still unknown since Martin Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo’s death.

ISSUES:

1.     Whether or not Pablo’s death occurred in the course of employment and arising out of the employment.

2.     Whether the PROXIMITY RULE should apply in this case.

3.     Whether the death of Pablo was an accident within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

HELD:

1.     YES. Workmen’s compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arises out of and in the course of employment. Both the “arising” factor and the “course” factor must be present. If one factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work connected. The words “arising out of” refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words “in the course” refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. The presumption that the injury arises out of and in the course of employment prevails where the injury occurs on the employer’s premises. While the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate. Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right therefore is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the road.

2.     YES. The general rule in workmen’s compensation law known as going and coming rule provides that in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen’s compensation acts. The following are the exceptions: a. Where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer b. Where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress. Where the employee is charged while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment. Where the employer, as an incident of the employment provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment. The second exception is known as the “proximity rule.” The place where the employee was injured being immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of or in the course thereof.

3.     YES. An “assault” although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an “accident” within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act since the word accident is intended to indicate that the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible.

Mafinco Trading Corp. vs. Ople

GR No. L-37790

March 25, 1976

FACTS:

Cosmos Aerated Water Factory, a firm based at Malabon, Rizal, appointed petitioner Mafinco as its sole distributor of Cosmos soft drinks in Manila. Rodrigo Repomanta and Mafinco executed a peddling contract whereby Repomanta agreed to buy and sell Cosmos soft drinks. Rey Moralde entered into a similar contract. Months later, Mafinco terminated the peddling contract with Repomanta and Moralde. Consequently, Repomanta and Moralde, through their union, filed a complaint with the NLRC, charging the general manager of Mafinco for illegally dismissing them.4.Mafinco filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction because Repomanta and Moralde were not its employees but were independent contractors. It stressed that there was termination of the contract not a dismissal of an employee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship between petitioner Mafinco and private respondents Repomanta and Moralde.

HELD:  

The Supreme Court held that under the peddling contracts, Repomanta and Moralde were not employees of Mafinco but were independent contractors as found by the NLC and its fact finder and by the committee appointed by the Secretary of Labor to look into the status of Cosmos and Mafinco peddlers. A contract whereby one engages to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied by the manufacturer but providing that the other party (peddler) shall have the right to employ his own workers, shall post a bond to protect the manufacturer against losses, shall be responsible for damages caused to third persons, shall obtain the necessary licenses and permits and bear the expenses incurred in the sale of the soft drinks is not a contract of employment.

Pan American World Airways System vs. Pan American Employees Association

1 SCRA 527

FACTS:
Petitioner herein claims that the one hour meal period should not be considered as overtime work, because the evidence showed that complainants could rest completely, and were not in any manner under the control of the company during that period. The court below found, on the contrary, that during the so-called meal period, the mechanics were required to stand by for emergency work; that if they happened not to be available when called, they were reprimanded by the lead man; that as in fact it happened on many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals or told to hurry up eating to perform work during this period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1 hour meal period of the mechanics is considered working time.

HELD: 
Yes. The Industrial Court’s order for permanent adoption of a straight 8-hour shift including the meal period was but a consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest but was actually a work hour, since for its duration, the laborers had to be on ready call.

Progressive Worker's Union vs. Aguas

G.R. No. L-59711-12

May 29, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioner Progressive Workers' Union is the local chapter of the Federation of Free Workers [FFW] in respondent company, Solid Mills, Inc. In the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] entered into by and between Solid Mills, Inc. and the FFW as the certified bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees, respondent company agreed to grant across-the-board wage increases to covered bargaining unit employees.

Respondent company implemented the CBA stipulation by giving the union members a retroactive pay for the first year wage increase, without further including wage increase into the basic wage rate of the rank-and-file employees. Contending that the wage increase for a particular period should be included in the basic wage rate, the individual petitioners, presented a grievance to respondent company demanding strict and faithful compliance with said CBA provision. Grievance meetings thereafter held between the representatives of the Union and the respondent company proved to be unavailing. Hence, the Union filed with the Conciliation Division, Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor & Employment [MOLE], Manila, a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, violation of CBA, violation of SS law, job evaluation and failure to restate work week.

The union went on strike and on the same day, respondent company filed with the NLRC, MOLE, petitions praying in the main that the strike staged by the union be declared illegal and the participating officers and members thereof be declared to have lost their employment status. Respondent company likewise prayed for a preliminary injunction/restraining order commanding the union, its members, agents, representatives and sympathizers to lift their picket lines and allow free and unobstructed ingress to and egress from the company and to refrain from committing coercion, threats and other illegal acts.

The union filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the ground that under B.P. 130, the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaints or the nature of the actions.

ISSUES:

WON the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition and complaint or the nature of action or suit filed by the petitioners.

HELD:

The Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction over the case. Declaring a strike or lockout to be illegal requires the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial authority, which in this instance is located in the National Labor Relations Commission. Under Article 217 of the labor Code, as amended, Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over, among other disputes, "all other claims arising from employer- employee relations," and the Commission has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. This statement of jurisdiction is intended to cover all disputes between employers and employees arising from their relationship as such, including those involving the legality of concerted actions.

Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Anastacio D. Abad

G.R. No. 158045

February 28, 2005

FACTS: 

Anastacio D. Abad was the senior Assistant Manager (Sales Head) of petitioner Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank now Equitable PCI Bank)], when he was dismissed from his work. Abad received a Memorandum from petitioner Bank concerning the irregular clearing of PNB-Naval Check of Sixtu Chu, the Bank’s valued client. Abad submitted his Answer, categorically denying that he instructed his subordinates to validate the out-of-town checks of Sixtu Chu presented for deposit or encashment as local clearing checks. During the actual investigation conducted by petitioner Bank, several transactions violative of the Bank’s Policies and Rules and Regulations were uncovered by the Fact-Finding Committee. Consequently, the Fact-Finding Officer of petitioner Bank issued another Memorandum to Abad asking the latter to explain the newly discovered irregularities. Not satisfied with the explanations of Abad, petitioner Bank served another Memorandum, terminating his employment effective immediately upon receipt of the same. Thus, Abad instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not awarding of separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service to respondent is gross, the same being contrary to law and jurisprudence.

HELD:

The award of separation pay is required for dismissals due to causes specified under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as for illegal dismissals in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an employee dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not, as a rule, entitled to separation pay.

As an exception, allowing the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is based on equity. The Court has granted separation pay as a measure of social justice even when an employee has been validly dismissed, as long as the dismissal was not due to serious misconduct or reflective of personal integrity or morality.

Royal Crowne International vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 78085

October 16, 1989

FACTS: 

Petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed private respondent Virgilio for employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. Service agreement was executed by private respondent and ZAMEL whereby the former was to receive per month a salary of US$500.00 plus US$100.00 as allowance for a period of one year commencing from the date of his arrival in Saudi Arabia. However, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the ground that his performance was below par. For three successive days thereafter, he was detained at his quarters and was not allowed to report to work until his exit papers were ready. On February 16, 1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the Philippines. Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal termination against Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale and ZAMEL with the POEA. 

Petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules implementing the same, which either provides for the "third-party liability" of an employment agency or recruiting entity for violations of an employment agreement performed abroad, or designates it as the agent of the foreign-based employer for purposes of enforcing against the latter claims arising out of anemployment agreement. Therefore, petitioner concludes, it cannot be held jointly and severally liable with ZAMEL for violations, if any, of private respondent's service agreement. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agencymay be held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in connection with the implementation of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed abroad. 

HELD: 

Yes, Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had voluntarily assumed solidary liability under the various contractual undertakings it submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment and placement, petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of the contracts of employment with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment. It was also required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former, which contained a provisionempowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. Petitioner was required as well to post such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of employment as appropriate. 

These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its principal, the foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in connection with the implementation of the service agreements or employment contracts. 

People vs. Jamilosa

GR No. 169076 

January 23, 2007 

FACTS:

Sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, representing to have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or transport workers for overseas employment, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants, namely, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for work or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home and Care Center.

Prosecution presented three witnesses, namely Imelda Bamba, Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh.

According to Bamba, she met the appellant on a bus. She was on her way to SM North Edsa where she was a company nurse. Appellant introduced himself as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad. Appellant told her he could help her get employed as nurse. Appellant gave his pager number and instructed her to contact him is she’s interested. Sometime in January 1996, appellant fetched her at her office, went to her house and gave him the necessary documents and handed to appellant the amount of US$300.00 and the latter showed her a photocopy of her supposed US visa. However, the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money. Thereafter, appellant told her to resign from her work because she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for USA on Feb, 1996. On the scheduled departure, appellant failed to show up. Instead, called and informed her that he failed to give the passport and US visa because she had to go to province because his wife died. Trying to contact him to the supposed residence and hotel where he temporarily resided, but to no avail.

Winess Lagman testified that she is a registered nurse. In January 1996, she went to SM North Edsa to visit her cousin Bamba. At that time Bamba informed her that she was going to meet to appellant. Bamba invited Lagman to go with her. The appellant convinced them of his ability to send them abroad. On their next meeting, Lagman handed to the latter the necessary documents and an amount of US$300.00 and 2 bottles of black label without any receipt issued by the appellant. Four days after their meeting, a telephone company called her because her number was appearing in appellants cell phone documents. The caller is trying to locate him as he was a swindler. She became suspicious and told Bamba about the matter. One week before her scheduled flight, appellant told her he could not meet them because his mother passed away.

Lastly, Alma Singh, who is also a registered nurse, declared that she first met the appellant at SM North Edsa when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to her. Appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of FBI and he could fix her US visa. On their next meeting, she gave all the pertinent documents. Thereafter, she gave P10,000 to the appellant covering half price of her plane ticket. They paged the appellant through his beeper to set up another appointment but the appellant avoided them as he had many things to do.

The accused Jamilosa testified on direct examination that he never told Bamba that he could get her a job in USA, the truth being that she wanted to leave SM as company nurse because she was having a problem thereat. Bamba called him several times, seeking advices from him. He started courting Bamba and went out dating until latter became his girlfriend. He met Lagman and Singh thru Bamba. As complainants seeking advice on how to apply for jobs abroad, lest he be charged as a recruiter, he made Bamba, Lagman and Singh sign separate certifications, all to effect that he never recruited them and no money was involved. Bamba filed an illegal recruitment case against him because they quarreled and separated.

RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale.

ISSUE:

W/N the trial court erred in convicting accused appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale

HELD: “Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Provided, That any such non- licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.

To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group. As gleaned from the collective testimonies of the complaining witnesses which the trial court and the appellate court found to be credible and deserving of full probative weight, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. Indeed, the findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals ignored, misunderstood, or misapplied substantial fact or other circumstance.

The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document signed by appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor does not free him from criminal liability. Even in the absence of money or other valuables given as consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter is considered as being engaged in recruitment activities. It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.